Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Brahma Sutras - Part XXXXXXXVIII

Section 2: Samudayadhikaranam: Topic 4 (Sutras 18-27)

Refutation of the Bauddha Realists.

Samudaya ubhayahetuke'pi tadapraptih II.2.18 (189)
Even if the (two kinds of) aggregates proceed from their two causes, there would take place non-establishment (of the two aggregates).
Samudaya: the aggregate; Ubhayahetuke: having two causes; Api: also, even; Tadapraptih: it will not take place, it cannot be established.
After refuting the atomic theory of Vaiseshika, the Buddhistic theories are now refuted.
Lord Buddha had four disciples who founded four systems of philosophy, called respectively Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogachara and Madhyamika. The Vaibhashikas are the Realists (Sarvastitvavadins) who accept the reality of both the outside and the inside world consisting respectively of external objects and thought (also consciousness, feelings, etc.). The Sautrantikas are the Idealists (Vijnanavadins). They hold that thought alone is real. They maintain that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not, the ideas only exist and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhashikas hold that the external objects are directly perceived while the Sautrantikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third class, the Yogacharas hold that ideas alone are real and there is no external world corresponding to these ideas. The outward objects are unreal like dream objects.
The Madhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal and there is nothing that exists except the void (Sunyam). They are the Nihilists or Sunyavadins who hold that everything is void and unreal. All of them agree that everything is momentary. Nothing lasts beyond a moment. Things of the previous moment do not exist in the next moment. One appears and the next moment it is replaced by another. There is no connection between the one and the other. Everything is like a scene in a cinema which is produced by the successive appearance and disappearance of several isolated pictures.
The Realists recognise two aggregates, viz., the external material world and the internal mental world, which together make up the universe. The external world is made up of the aggregate of atoms, which are of four kinds, viz., atoms of earth which are solid, atoms of water which are viscid, atoms of fire which are hot and atoms of air which are mobile.
The five Skandhas or groups are the cause for the internal world. They are Rupa Skandha, Vijnana Skandha, Vedana Skandha, Samjna Skandha and Samskara Skandha. The senses and their objects form the Rupa Skandha. Vijnana Skandha is the stream of consciousness which gives the notion of egoism or 'I'. The Vedana Skandha comprises the feeling of pleasure and pain. The Samjna Skandha consists of names such as Ramakrishna, etc. All words thus constitute the Samjna Skandha. The fifth Skandha called Samskara Skandha consists of the attributes of the mind such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit (Dharma), demerit (Adharma), etc. All internal objects belong to any one of the last four Skandhas. The four last Skandhas form the internal objects. All activities depend upon the internal objects. The internal objects constitute the inner motive of everything. All external objects belong to one Skandha namely the Rupa Skandha. Thus the whole universe consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. The internal aggregate or the mental world is formed by the aggregate of the last four Skandhas. These are the two internal and external aggregates referred to in the Sutra.
The theory of the Bauddhas which classifies all objects under two heads, one aggregate being called the external, the other internal, is not sufficient to explain the world order; because all aggregates are unintelligent and there is no permanent intelligence admitted by the Bauddhas which can bring about this aggregation. Everything is momentary in its existence according to the Bauddhas. There is no permanent intelligent being who brings about the conjunction of these Skandhas. The continuation is not possible for these external atoms and internal sensations without the intervention of an intelligent guide. If it be said they come together of their own internal motion, then the world becomes eternal; because the Skandhas will be constantly bringing about creation as they are eternal and as they possess motion of their own. Thus this theory is untenable.
It cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about, because the parts that constitute the material aggregates are destitute of intelligence. The Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being such as enjoying soul or a ruling lord, which could effect the aggregation of atoms.
How are the aggregates formed? Is there any intelligent principle behind the aggregates as the Cause, the Guide, the Controller or the Director? Or does it take place spontaneously? If you say that there is an intelligent principle, is it permanent or momentary? If it is permanent, then the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness is opposed. If it is momentary, it must come into existence first and then unite the atoms. Then the cause should last more than one moment. If there is no intelligent principle as director or controller, how can non-intelligent atoms and the Skandhas aggregate in an orderly manner? Further, the creation would continue for ever. There would be no dissolution.
For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be properly explained. Without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of earthly existence which presupposes those aggregates. Therefore, the doctrine of this school of Bauddhas is untenable and inadmissible.

Itaretarapratyayatvaditi chennotpattimatranimittatvat II.2.19 (190)
If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (nescience) standing in the relation of mutual causality, we say 'no'; they merely are the efficient cause of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links and not of the aggregation).
Itara-itara: mutual, one another; Pratyayatvat: because of being the cause, one being the cause of the other; Iti: thus; Chet: if; (Iti chet: if it be said);Na: no; Utpattimatranimittatvat: because they are merely the efficient cause of the origin.
An objection against Sutra 18 is raised and refuted.
The series beginning with nescience comprise the following members: Nescience, Samskara or impression, Vijnana (knowledge), name and form, the abode of the six (i.e., the body and the senses, contact, experience of pleasure and pain, desire, activity, merit, demerit, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, mental affliction and the like).
Nescience is the error of considering that what is momentary, impure, etc., to be permanent, pure, etc. Impression, (affection, Samskara) comprises desire, aversion, etc., and the activity caused by them. Knowledge (Vijnana) is the self-consciousness (Aham iti alayavijnanasya vrittilabhah) springing up in the embryo. Name and form is the rudimentary flake or bubble-like condition of the embryo. The abode of the six (Sadayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses. Touch (Sparsa) is the sensation of cold, warmth, etc., on the embryo's part. Feeling (Vedana) is the sensation of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom. Desire (Trishna) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. Activity (Upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. Birth is the passing out from the uterus. Species (Jati) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs. Decay (Jara), death (Marana) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (Mumursha). Grief (Soka) is the frustration of wishes connected therewith. Lament (Parivedana): the lamentations on that account. Pain (Duhkha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. Durmanas is mental affliction. The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.
The Buddhistic realist says: Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord of an enjoying soul under whose influence the formation of the aggregates could take place, yet the course of earthly existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality of nescience (ignorance) and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.
Nescience, Samskara, etc., constitute an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect. In the above series the immediately preceding item is the cause of the next. The wheel of cause and effect revolves unceasingly like the water-wheel and this cannot take place without aggregates. Hence aggregates are a reality.
We reply: Though in the series the preceding one is the cause of the subsequent one, there is nothing which can be the cause of the aggregates. It may be argued that the union of atom and the continuous flow of sensations are proved by the mutual interdependence existing among them. But the argument cannot stand, as this mutual interdependence cannot be the cause of their cohesion. Of two things one may produce the other, but that is no reason why they should unite together.
Even if Avidya (nescience), Samskara, Vijnana, Nama, and Rupa, etc., may without a sentient or intelligent agency pass from the stage of cause to the stage of effect, yet how can the totality of all these simultaneously exist without the will of a coordinating mind?
If you say that this aggregate or the world is formed by the mutual causation of Avidya and the rest, we say it is not so, because your link of causation explains only the origin of the subsequent from the previous. It only explains how Vijnana arises from Samskara, etc. It does not explain how the aggregate is brought about. An aggregate called Sanghata always shows a design and is brought about for the purpose of enjoyment. A Sanghata like a house may be explained to have been produced by putting together of bricks, mortar, etc., but they do not explain the design. You say that there is no permanent Atman. Your Atman is momentary only. You are a Kshanikatvavadin. There can be no enjoyment or experiencing for such a momentary soul; because the enjoying soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose fruits it has to enjoy. It was produced by another momentary soul. You cannot say that the momentary soul suffers the fruits of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul must be held to be permanent and not momentary. If you hold any soul to be permanent, it will contradict your theory of the momentariness of everything. But if you hold everything to be impermanent, your theory is open to the objection already made. Hence the doctrine of the Sanghatas (Buddhists) is untenable. It is not based on reason.
The atoms cannot combine by themselves even when they are assumed to be permanent and eternal. We have already shown this when examining the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas. Their combination is much more impossible when they are momentary.
The Bauddhas say that a combining principle of the atoms is not necessary if the atoms stand in a relation of causality. The atoms would combine by themselves. This is incorrect. The causality will explain only the production of atoms at different moments. It cannot certainly explain the union of the atom into an aggregate. The combination of an aggregate can take place only if there is an intelligent agent behind. Otherwise it is impossible to explain the union of inert and momentary atoms.
You will say that in the eternal Samsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain and hence also Nescience and so on which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that it may produce either a like or an unlike one without any settled or definite rule. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions as like will go on producing like; in the latter case a man might in an instant become an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.
The individual soul for whose enjoyment this aggregate of body etc., exists is also evanescent or momentary. It cannot therefore be an enjoyer. As the individual soul is momentary, whose is liberation? As there is no permanent enjoyer, there is no necessity for these aggregates. There may exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, etc., but in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is not possible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates. Hence the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhist school of Realists cannot stand.

Uttarotpade cha purvanirodhat II.2.20 (191)
(Nor can there be a causal relation between nescience, etc.) because on the origination of the subsequent thing the preceding one ceases to be.
Uttarotpade: at the time of the production of the subsequent thing; Cha: and;Purvanirodhat: because the antecedent one has ceased to exist, because of the destruction of the previous thing. (Uttara: in the next, in the subsequent;Utpade: on the origination, on the production.)
The argument against the Buddhistic theory, commenced in Sutra 18, is continued.
We have hitherto argued that nescience and so on stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of the aggregates. We are now going to prove that they cannot even be regarded as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.
According to the Buddhistic theory everything is momentary. A thing of the present moment vanishes in the next moment when its successor manifests. At the time of the appearance of a subsequent thing, the previous thing vanishes. Hence it is impossible for the previous thing to be the cause of the subsequent thing. Consequently the theory is untenable and inadmissible. It cannot stand to reason.
We always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect as the thread subsists in the cloth. But the Buddhists hold that existence originates from non-existence because they maintain that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause, the tree cannot appear until the seed is destroyed.
Even the passing of cause into effect in a series of successive states like nescience, etc., cannot take place, unless there is a coordinating intelligence. You say that everything has only a momentary existence. Your School cannot bring about the simultaneous existence of two successive moments. If the cause exists till it passes into the stage of effect, the theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) will vanish.
You may say that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence. That also is impossible, because even that will require a successive or second moment for operation. This contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.
The theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) cannot stand. The gold that exists at the time the ornament is made is alone the cause of the ornament and not that which existed before and has ceased to exist then. If it be still held to be the cause, then existence will come out of non-existence. This is not possible. The theory of momentariness will contradict the doctrine that the effect is the cause in a new form. This doctrine indicates that the cause exists in the effect. This shows that it is not momentary. Further, origination and destruction will be the same owing to momentariness. If it is said that there is difference between origination and destruction, then we will have to say that the thing lasts for more than one moment. Hence we have again to declare the doctrine of momentariness to be untenable.

Asati pratijnoparodho yaugapadyamanyatha II.2.21 (192)
If non-existence (of cause) be assumed, (while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle or proposition. Otherwise there would result simultaneity (of cause and effect).
Asati: in the case of non-existence of cause, if it be admitted that an effect is produced without a cause; Pratijna: proposition, admitted principle;Uparodhah: contradiction, denial; Yaugapadyam: simultaneity, simultaneous existence; Anyatha: otherwise.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
If the Buddhists say that an effect is produced without a cause then they would contradict their own proposition that every effect has a cause. The proposition admitted by Buddhists that the consciousness of blue, etc., arises when mind, eye, light and object act in union as cause will fail. All sorts of effects can co-exist.
If a cause be assumed then we have to accept that the cause and effect exist simultaneously at the next moment. The cause exists for more than one moment. The cause exists till the state of effect is reached. Then the doctrine of momentariness will fail.

Pratisankhyapratisankhyanirodhapraptiravicchedat II.2.22 (193)
Conscious and unconscious destruction would be impossible on account of non-interruption.
Pratisankhya nirodha: conscious destruction, destruction due to some cause or agency; causal destruction, destruction depending upon the volition of conscious entity; Apratisankhya nirodha: unconscious destruction, destruction not depending upon any voluntary agency; Apraptih: non-attainment, impossibility; Avicchedat: because of non-interruption, because it goes on without interruption.
The argument against the theory of the Buddhists is continued.
The Buddhists hold that universal destruction is ever going on and that this destruction or cessation is of two kinds, viz., conscious and unconscious. Conscious destruction depends upon an act of thought as when a man breaks a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so. Unconscious destruction is the natural decay of objects.
The flow of cause and effect goes on without interruption and therefore cannot be subject to either kind of destruction. Nor can any individual antecedent of a series be said to be totally destroyed, as it is recognised in its immediate consequence.
Both kinds of destruction or cessation are impossible because it must refer either to the series of momentary existences or to the single members constituting the series.
The former alternative is not possible because in all series of momentary existences the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted. The latter alternative is similarly not admissible, because it is not possible to hold that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected with the previous state of existence, as we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence. When an earthen jar is destroyed we find the existence of the clay in the potsherds or fragments into which the jar is broken or in the powder into which the potsherds are ground. We infer that even though what seems to vanish altogether such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continues to exist in some other form, viz., as steam.
The series of momentary existence forming a chain of causes and effect is continuous and can never be stopped, because the last momentary existence before its annihilation must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. If it does, then the series is continued and will not be destroyed. If it does not produce the effect, the last link does not really exist as the Bauddhas define Satta of a thing as its causal efficiency and the non-existence of the last link would lead backward to the non-existence of the whole series.
We cannot have then two kinds of destruction in the individual members of the series also. Conscious destruction is not possible on account of the momentary existence of each member. There cannot be unconscious destruction as the individual member is not totally annihilated. Destruction of a thing really means only change of condition of the substance.
You cannot say that when a candle is burnt out, it is totally annihilated. When a candle burns out, it is not lost but undergoes a change of condition. We do not certainly perceive the candle when it is burnt out, but the materials of which it consisted continue to exist in a very subtle state and hence they are imperceptible.
For these reasons the two kinds of destruction which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

Ubhayatha cha doshat II.2.23 (194)
And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
Ubhayatha: in either case; Cha: and, also; Doshat: because of objections.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
There is a fallacy in either view, i.e., that Avidya or ignorance is destroyed by right knowledge or self-destroyed.
According to the Buddhistic view, emancipation is the annihilation of ignorance. Salvation or freedom is attained when ignorance is destroyed. Ignorance (Avidya or nescience) is the false idea of permanency in things which are momentary.
The ignorance can be annihilated by the adoption of some means such as penance, knowledge, etc., (conscious destruction); or it may destroy itself (spontaneity). But both the alternatives are defective. Because this annihilation of ignorance cannot be attained by the adoption of penance or the like; for the mean like every other thing, is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view and is, therefore, not likely to produce such annihilation; annihilation cannot take place of its own accord, for in that case all Buddhistic instructions, the disciplines and methods of meditation for the attainment of emancipation will be useless.
According to the Buddhistic theory, there can be no voluntary exertion on the part of the aspirant for the breaking asunder of his continued worldly experiences or nescience. There is no hope of their ever coming to an end by mere exhaustion as the causes continue to generate their effects which again continue to generate their own effects and so on and there is no occasion left for practices for attaining release.
Thus in the Buddhistic system release or freedom can never be established. The teaching of the Buddhists cannot stand the test of reasoning.

Aakase chaviseshat II.2.24 (195)
The cause of Akasa (ether) also not being different (from the two other kinds of destruction it also cannot be a non-entity.)
Akase: in the case of Akasa or ether; Cha: also, and; Aviseshat: because of no specific difference.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
We have shown in Sutras 22-23 that the two kinds of destruction (cessation) are not totally destitute of all positive characteristics and so cannot be non-entities. We now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, Akasa).
The Buddhists do not recognise the existence of Akasa. They regard Akasa as a non-entity. Akasa is nothing but the absence of covering or occupying body (Avaranabhava). This is un-reasonable. Akasa has the quality of sound, just as earth has smell, water taste, fire form, air touch. Akasa also is a distinct entity like earth, water, etc. Hence there is no reason why Akasa also should be rejected as a non-entity, while earth, water, etc., are recognised as being entities.
Just as earth, air, etc., are regarded as entities on account of their being the substratum of attributes like smell, etc., so also Akasa should be considered as an entity on account of its being the substratum of sound, earth, water, etc., that are experienced through their respective qualities, viz., smell, taste, form, touch. The existence of Akasa is experienced through its quality, sound. Hence Akasa also must be an entity.
Space is inferred from its attribute of sound, just as earth is inferred from smell. Where there is relation of substance and attribute there must be an object. The Buddhists hold that space is mere non-existence of matter (Avaranabhavamatram). If so, a bird may fall down as there is no obstructive matter, but how can it fly up? Non-existence of matter is space which is a positive object and not mere negation or non-entity.
The doctrine that Akasa is an absolute non-entity is not tenable. Why do you say so? Aviseshat, because there is no difference in the case of Akasa from any other kind of substance which is an object of perception. We perceive space when we say, "the crow flies in space." The space, therefore, is as much a real substance as the earth, etc. As we know the earth by its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste, and so on, so we know from the quality of being the abode of objects, the existence of space, and that it has the quality of sound. Thus Akasa is a real substance and not a non-entity.
If Akasa be a non-entity, then the entire world would become destitute of space.
Scriptural passages declare "Space sprang from the Atman" (Atmana akasassambhutah). So Akasa is a real thing. It is a Vastu (existing object) and not non-existence.
O Buddhists! You say that air exists in Akasa. In the Bauddha scriptures, a series of questions and answers beginning "On which, O revered Sir, is the earth founded?" in which the following question occurs, "On which is the air founded?" to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. If Akasa was totally non-existent, what would be the receptacle of air?
You cannot say that space is nothing but the absence of any occupying object. This also cannot stand to reason. If you say that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering or occupying body, then when one bird is flying, whereby space is occupied, there would be no room for a second bird which wishes to fly at the same time. You may give an answer that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body. But we declare that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz., space in our sense and not the mere non-existing of covering bodies.
Moreover, there is a self-contradiction in the statements of Buddhists with reference to the three kinds of negative entities (Nirupakhya). They say that the negative entities are not positively definable, and also are eternal. It is absurd to talk of a non-being as being eternal or evanescent. The distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution totally rests on real things. Where there is such distinction, there exists the real thing such as pot, etc., which is not a mere undefinable negation or non-entity.

Anusmritescha II.2.25 (196)
And on account of memory the things are not momentary.
Anusmriteh: on account of memory; Cha: and.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
The theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is refuted here. If everything is momentary the experiencer of something must also be momentary. But the experiencer is not momentary, because people have the memory of past experiences. Memory can take place only in a man who has previously experienced it, because we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. It is not that the experience is that one sees and another remembers. Our experience is "I saw and I now remember what I saw." He who experiences and remembers is the same. He is connected with at least two moments. This certainly refutes the theory of momentariness.
The Buddhists may say that memory is due to similarity. But unless there be one permanent knowing subject, who can perceive the similarity in the past with the present. One cannot say "This is the pot, this is the chair which was in the past." So long there is not the same soul which saw and which now remembers, how can mere similarity bring about such a consciousness as "I saw and I now remember (Pratyabhijna)?" The knowing subject must be permanent and not momentary.
Doubt may arise with reference to an external object. You may not be able to say whether it is identically the same object which was perceived in the past or something similar to it. But with reference to the Self, the cognising subject, there can never arise any such doubt whether I am the same who was in the past, for it is impossible that the memory of a thing perceived by another should exist in one's own Self.
If you say that this, the thing remembered, is like that, the thing seen, in that case also two things are connected by one agent. If the thing perceived was separate and ceased totally, it cannot be referred at all. Moreover the experience is not that "this is like that" but that "this is that."
We admit that sometimes with reference to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; because mistake may occur concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself. It is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and remembers that sensation today. Does any one doubt whether he who remembers is the same as he who saw?
For this reason also the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is to be rejected.
We do not perceive objects coming into existence in a moment or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of momentariness of all things is refuted.

Nasato'dristatvat II.2.26 (197)
(Existence or entity does) not (spring) from non-existence or non-entity, because it is not seen.
Na: not; Asatah: from non-existence, of the unreal, of a non-entity;Adrishtatvat: because it is not seen.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
A non-entity has not been observed to produce entity. Therefore it does not stand to reason to suppose non-entity to be the cause.
The Bauddhas (Vainasikas) assert that no effect can be produced from anything that is unchanging and eternal, because an unchanging thing cannot produce an effect. So they declare that the cause perishes before the effect is produced. They say from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a pot. So existence comes out of non-existence.
According to the view of the Buddhists, a real thing, i.e., the world has come into existence out of nothing. But experience shows that this theory is false. A pot for instance is never found to be produced without clay. Such a hypothetical production can only exist in the imagination, for example, the child of a barren woman. Hence the view of the Buddhists is untenable and inadmissible.
If existence can come out of non-existence, if being can proceed from non-being, then the assumption of special causes would have no meaning at all. Then anything may come out of anything, because non-entity is one and the same in all cases. There is no difference between the non-entity of a mango seed and that of a jack-seed. Hence a jack tree may come out of a mango seed. Sprouts also may originate from the horns of hares. If there are different kinds of non-existence, having special distinctions just as for instance, blueness and the like are the special qualities of lotuses and so on, the non-existence of a mango seed will differ from that of a jack-seed, and then this would turn non-entities into entities.
Moreover if existence springs from non-existence all effects would be affected with non-existence, but they are seen to be positive entities with their various special characteristics.
The horn of a hare is non-existent. What can come out from that horn? We see only being emerging from being, e.g., ornament from gold, etc.
According to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four Skandhas and all material aggregates from the atoms. And yet they say at the same time that entity is born of non-entity. This is certainly quite inconsistent and self-contradictory. They stultify their own doctrine and needlessly confuse the minds of every one.

Udasinanamapi chaivam siddhih II.2.27 (198)
And thus (if existence should spring from non-existence, there would result) the attainment of the goal by the indifferent and non-active people also.
Udasianam: of the indifferent and non-active; Api: even, also; Cha: and;Evam: thus; Siddih: success accomplishment, and attainment of the goal.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
If it were admitted that existence or entity springs from non-existence or non entity, lazy inactive people also would attain their purpose. Rice will grow even if the farmer does not cultivate his field. Jars will shape themselves even if the potter does not fashion the clay. The weaver too will have finished pieces of cloth without weaving. No body will have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for attaining final emancipation. All this is absurd and not maintained by anybody.
Thus the doctrine of the origination of existence or entity from non-existence or non-entity is untenable or inadmissible.

Brahma Sutras - Part XXXXXXXVII

Section 2: Paramanujagadakaranatvadhikaranam: Topic 3 (Sutras 12-17)

Refutation of the atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas.
The objection against the view of Vedanta has been answered in the previous Sutra. Now the Vaiseshika system is refuted.

Ubhayathapi na karmatastadabhavah II.2.12 (183)
In both cases also (in the cases of the Adrishta, the unseen principle inhering either in the atoms or the soul) the activity (of the atoms) is not possible; hence negation of that (viz., creation through the union of the atoms).
Ubhayatha: in either case, in both ways, on both assumptions or hypotheses;Api: also; Na: not; Karma: action, activity, motion; Atah: therefore;Tadabhavah: absence of that, negation of that, i,e, negation of the creation of the world by union of atoms.
The argument against the Vaiseshika system commenced in Sutra 11 is continued.
What is the cause that first operates on the ultimate atoms? Vaiseshikas hold that the motion which is due to the unseen principle (Adrishta) joins the atom in which it resides, to another atom. Thus binary compounds, etc. are produced and finally the element of air. Similarly fire, water, earth, the body with its organs are produced. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. The qualities of the binary compounds are produced from the qualities inhering in the atoms, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads. Such is the teaching of the Vaiseshika system of philosophy.
The motion in the atoms cannot be brought about by the Adrishta residing in the atoms, because the Adrishta which is the resultant of the good and bad actions of the soul cannot reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. The Adrishta residing in the soul cannot produce motion in the atom. The motion of the atom is not explained on both these views. As Adrishta is insentient it cannot act. As Adrishta is in the soul, how can it operate in the atoms? If it can, such operation will go on for ever as there is no agency to control it. When two atoms combine do they unite perfectly or not? If they unite totally, if there is total interpenetration, the atomic state will continue as there will be no increase in bulk. If in part, then atoms will have parts. This is against the theory of the Vaiseshikas. Moreover, if they combine once, there cannot be separation or dissolution. Adrishta will be active to bring about creation for the enjoyment of the fruits of actions. For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
The Vaiseshikas may argue that the motion originates in the atoms as soon as they come in the proximity of the souls charged with any definite Adrishta. This also is untenable. Because there can be no proximity or contact between the souls which are partless and the atoms which also are partless.
An insentient object cannot move another as it is inert. All motion of objects are initiated, guided and directed by intelligence and intelligent beings.
The soul cannot be the cause of the primal motion of the atoms at the beginning of creation. Because in dissolution, according to the Vaiseshikas, the soul itself lies dormant without possessing any intelligence and hence is in no way superior to the atom.
It cannot be said also that the primal motion of the atom is caused by the will of the Lord in conformity with the Adrishta of the souls, because the Adrishtas of the souls do not mature and are not awakened. Hence the will of the Lord is not active.
As there is thus no motion in the atoms in the beginning of the creation, they cannot come together and form an aggregate. Consequently, there can be no creation as the binary compounds cannot be produced.
According to the Vaiseshikas, the universe is created by the union of the atoms. Now what causes this union? If it is a seen cause, it is not possible before the creation of the body. A seen cause can be an endeavour or an impact. There can be no endeavour on the part of the soul if there is no connection of the soul with mind. As there is neither body nor mind before creation, there cannot be any endeavour. Similar is the case with impact or the like.
What causes the union of the atoms? Adrishta or the unseen principle cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms because the Adrishta is non-intelligent. There is no intelligence to guide the Adrishta. Hence it cannot act by itself.
Does the Adrishta inhere in the soul or the atoms? If it is inherent in the soul, there is no intelligence to direct the Adrishta as the soul is then inert. Moreover, the soul is partless like the atoms. Consequently, there cannot be any connection between the soul and the atoms. Hence, if the Adrishta inheres in the soul, it cannot produce motion in the atoms which are not connected with the soul.
If the Adrishta is inherent in the atoms, there would be no dissolution because the atoms will ever be active as the Adrishta is always present.
Therefore there is no possibility for original motion in the atoms and so combination of atoms is not possible.
Hence the theory of Vaiseshikas that the universe is caused by the combination of atoms is untenable.

Samavayabhyupagamaccha samyadanavasthiteh II.2.13 (184)
And because in consequence of Samavaya being admitted, a regresssus ad infinitumresults on similar reasoning (hence the Vaiseshika theory is untenable).
Samavayabhyupagamat: Samavaya being admitted; Cha: and, also; Samyat:because of equality of reasoning; Anavasthiteh: regressus ad infinitum would result.
The argument against the Vaiseshika philosophy commenced in Sutra 11 is continued.
Samavaya is inseparable inherence or concomitant cause or combining force. It is one of the seven categories of the Vaiseshika philosophy. It is the affinity which brings about the union of the atoms.
The Vaiseshikas say that two Paramanus become a Dvyanuka on account of the operation of the combining force (Samavaya) and that the Samavaya connects the dyad with its constituents, the two atoms, as the dyad and the atoms are of different qualities. Samavaya is different from the ultimate atoms and dyads which it connects. Why should it operate unless there be another Samavaya to make it operate? That new Samavaya will require another Samavaya to connect it with the first and so on. Thus their theory is vitiated by the fault of Anavastha Dosha or regressus ad infinitum.
The argument is faulty. Hence the atomic doctrine which admits Samavaya relationship for the union of the atoms is not admissible. It must be rejected as it is useless and as it is an incongruous assumption.

Nityameva cha bhavat II.2.14 (185)
And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity, the atomic theory is not admissible).
Nityam: eternal; Eva: certainly, even; Cha: and, also; Bhavat: because of the existence, from the possibility.
The argument against the Vaiseshika commencing in Sutra 11 is continued.
The atomic theory involves another difficulty. If the atoms are by nature active, then creation would be permanent. No Pralaya or dissolution could take place. If they are by nature inactive, no creation could take place. The dissolution would be permanent. Their nature cannot be both activity and inactivity because they are self-contradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to depend on an operative or efficient cause like Adrishta. As the Adrishta is in permanent proximity to the atoms, as the Adrishta is always connected with the atoms, they will be ever active. Consequently, creation would be permanent. If there is no efficient or operative cause, there will be no activity of the atoms. Consequently, there would be no creation.
For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable and inadmissible.

Rupadimatvacca viparyayo darsanat II.2.15 (186)
And on account of the atoms possessing colour, etc., the opposite (of which the Vaiseshikas hold would take place), because it is seen or observed.
Rupadimatvat: because of possessing colour, etc.; Cha: and, also;Viparyayah: the reverse, the opposite; Darsanat: because it is seen or observed, from common experience.
The argument against Vaiseshika commencing in Sutra 11 is continued.
According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, the atoms are said to have colour, etc. If this is not the case, the effects will not possess these qualities, as the qualities of the cause only are found in the effects. Then the atoms would no longer be atomic and permanent. Because that which has form, colour, etc., is gross, ephemeral and impermanent. Consequently the atoms, etc., which are endowed with colour etc., must be gross and inpermanent. This contradicts the theory of the Vaiseshikas that they are minute and permanent.
Hence the atomic theory, being thus self-contradictory, cannot be accepted. The atoms cannot be the ultimate cause of the universe. There would result from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, etc., the opposite of which the Vaiseshikas mean.

Ubhayatha cha doshat II.2.16 (187)
And because of defects in both cases (the atomic theory cannot be accepted).
Ubhayatha: in both ways, on either side, in either case; Cha: also, and;Doshat: because of defects (or difficulties).
The argument against Vaiseshikas is continued.
Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour and is gross. Water has colour, taste and touch and is fine. Fire has colour and touch and is finer still. Air is the finest of all and has the quality of touch only. The four gross elements earth, water, fire and air are produced from atoms.
If we suppose that the respective atoms of the elements also possess the same number of qualities as the gross elements, then the atom of air will have one quality, an atom of earth will have four qualities. Hence an atom of earth which possesses four qualities will be bigger in size. It would not be an atom any longer. It will not satisfy the definition of an atom.
If we suppose them all to possess the same number of qualities, in that case there cannot be any difference in the qualities of the effects, the gross elements because the attributes of the cause (the atoms) are reproduced in its effects (the gross elements).
If the atom is one and the same and has only one quality, then more than one quality should not be found. Fire should not have form in addition to touch as so on.
Hence, in either case the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas is defective and therefore untenable. It cannot be logically maintained.

Aparigrahacchatyantamanapeksha II.2.17 (188)
And because (the atomic theory) is not accepted (by authoritative sages like Manu and others) it is to be totally rejected.
Aparigrahat: because it is not accepted; Cha: and; Atyantam: altogether, totally, completely; Anapeksha: to be rejected.
The argument against Vaiseshika is concluded.
At least the Sankhya doctrine of Pradhana was accepted to some extent by Manu and other knowers of the Veda but the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any person of authority in any of its parts. Therefore, it is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.
Further, there are other objections to the Vaiseshika doctrine. The Vaiseshikas assume six categories or Padarthas viz., Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Karma (action), Samanya (generality), Visesha (particularity) and Samavaya (inherence). They maintain that the six categories are absolutely different from each other and possess different characteristics just as a man, a horse and a hare differ from one another. They say that the categories are independent and yet they hold that on Dravya the other five categories depend. This contradicts the former one. This is quite inappropriate. Just as animals, grass, trees and the like, being absolutely different from each other, do not depend on each other, so also the qualities etc., also being absolutely different from substance cannot depend on the latter.
The Vaiseshikas say that Dravya (substance) and Guna (quality) are inseparably connected. At the same time they say that each begins its activity. The threads bring the cloth into existence and the whiteness in the threads produces the whiteness in the cloth. "Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality" (Vaiseshika Sutras I.1.10). If the thread and its quality occupy the same space and are inseparably united, how can this take place? If the substance and the quality are inseparably together with reference to time, the two horns of a cow would have to grow together. If there is inseparability in the nature of the substance and its quality, why can you not say that both are one and identical. Hence the theory that the quality depends upon substance and that the quality and substance are inseparable, is untenable and inadmissible.
Further, the Vaiseshikas make distinction between Samyoga (conjunction) and Samavaya (inherence). They say that Samyoga is the connection of things which exists separately and Samavaya is the connection of things which are incapable of separate existence. This distinction is not tenable as the cause which exists before the effect cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. What is the proof of the existence of Samyoga or Samavaya apart from cause and effect? Nor is there any Samyoga or Samavaya apart from the things which become connected. The same man although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relation to others. Thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahmana, learned in the Veda, generous boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, etc. The same digit connotes different numbers, ten or hundred or thousand, according to its place.
Moreover, we have not seen Samyoga except as between things which occupy space. But mind is Anu and does not occupy space according to you. You cannot say that you will imagine some space for it. If you make such a supposition, there is no end to such suppositions. There is no reason why you should not assume a further hundred or thousand things in addition to the six categories assumed by the Vaiseshikas.
Moreover, two Paramanus which have no form cannot be united with a Dvyanuka which has form. There does not exist that kind of intimate connection between ether and earth which exists between wood and varnish.
Nor is the theory of Samavaya necessary to explain which, out of cause and effect, depends on the other. There is mutual dependence. Vedantins do not accept any difference between cause and effect. Effect is only cause in another form. The Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and the thing abiding. According to the Vedanta doctrine, the effect is only a certain state of the cause.
Moreover, Paramanus are finite and so they will have form. What has form must be liable to destruction.
Thus it is quite clear that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments. It is opposed to those scriptural texts which declare the Lord to be the general cause. It is not also accepted by sages like Manu and others. Therefore, it should be totally disregarded by wise men.

Narayaneeyam - Part XXXXXXXVI

Dashaka 76
गत्वा सान्दीपनिमथ चतुष्षष्टिमात्रैरहोभि:
सर्वज्ञस्त्वं सह मुसलिना सर्वविद्या गृहीत्वा ।
पुत्रं नष्टं यमनिलयनादाहृतं दक्षिणार्थं
दत्वा तस्मै निजपुरमगा नादयन् पाञ्चजन्यम् ॥१॥
गत्वा सान्दीपनिम्-अथgoing to the sage Saandipani, then
चतु:-षष्टि-मात्रै:-अहोभि:in 64 days only
सर्वज्ञ:-त्वंOmniscient Thou
सह मुसलिनाalong with Balaraama
सर्व-विद्या गृहीत्वाall knowledge mastering
पुत्रं नष्टंthe dead son
यम-निलयनात्-आहृतंfrom Yama's abode bringing
दक्षिणा-अर्थंby way of dakshinaa (to the teacher Sandipini)
दत्वा तस्मैgiving him
निज-पुरम्-अगाto Thy city went back
नादयन् पाञ्चजन्यम्sounding the conch Paanchajanya
Along with Balaraama Thou went to sage Sandipani's aashram and mastered all knowledge in just 64 days. Thou brought back Thy guru Sandipani's dead son from Yama's abode and gave him by way of Guru-dakshinaa. Thou then went back to Thy city sounding the conch Paanchajanya.
स्मृत्वा स्मृत्वा पशुपसुदृश: प्रेमभारप्रणुन्ना:
कारुण्येन त्वमपि विवश: प्राहिणोरुद्धवं तम् ।
किञ्चामुष्मै परमसुहृदे भक्तवर्याय तासां
भक्त्युद्रेकं सकलभुवने दुर्लभं दर्शयिष्यन् ॥२॥
स्मृत्वा स्मृत्वाremembering again and again
पशुप-सुदृश:the beautiful Gopikas
प्रेम-भार-प्रणुन्ना:who were overwhelmed with love for Thee
कारुण्येनwith compassion
त्वम्-अपि विवश:Thou also were overcome
प्राहिणो:-उद्धवं तम्(Thou) sent that Uddhava
किम्-च-अमुष्मैand besides to him
परम-सुहृदे(Thy) very dear friend
भक्तवर्याय तासांthose great devotees
भक्ति-उद्रेकंintense devotion
स्कल-भुवने दुर्लभंrare in the whole world
दर्शयिष्यन्wishing to show
Again and again Thou remembered the overwhelming love of the beautiful Gopikas for Thee. Thou were also overpowered with compassion for them. Thou sent Thy very dear friend Uddhava to them with a message. Also with the desire to demonstrate to him the intense devotion of those great devotees which was rare in the whole world.
त्वन्माहात्म्यप्रथिमपिशुनं गोकुलं प्राप्य सायं
त्वद्वार्ताभिर्बहु स रमयामास नन्दं यशोदाम् ।
प्रातर्द्दृष्ट्वा मणिमयरथं शङ्किता: पङ्कजाक्ष्य:
श्रुत्वा प्राप्तं भवदनुचरं त्यक्तकार्या: समीयु: ॥३॥
त्वत्-माहात्म्य-Thy greatness (and)
प्रथिम-पिशुनंmagnitude indicating
गोकुलं प्राप्य सायंto Gokula reaching in the evening
त्वत्-वार्ताभि:-बहुwith Thy many news
स रमयामासhe (Uddhava) delighted
नन्दं यशोदाम्Nanda and Yashodaa
प्रात:-दृष्ट्वाin the morning seeing
मणिमय-रथंthe bejewelled chariot
शङ्किता: पङ्कजाक्ष्य:suspecting, the lotus eyed women
श्रुत्वा प्राप्तंhearing (that) had come
भवत्-अनुचरंThy emissary (follower)
त्यक्त-कार्या:abondoning their work
Gokula's prosperity was an indication of the magnitude of Thy greatness. Reaching there in the evening, Uddhava delighted Nanda and Yashodaa with Thy many news. In the morning the lotus eyed women of Gokula saw the bejewelled chariot and suspected Thy arrival. They came to know that one of Thy emissaries had come. Abondoning their work, they gathered at the house of Nandagopa.
दृष्ट्वा चैनं त्वदुपमलसद्वेषभूषाभिरामं
स्मृत्वा स्मृत्वा तव विलसितान्युच्चकैस्तानि तानि ।
रुद्धालापा: कथमपि पुनर्गद्गदां वाचमूचु:
सौजन्यादीन् निजपरभिदामप्यलं विस्मरन्त्य: ॥४॥
दृष्ट्वा च-एनंand seeing him
त्वत्-उपम-similar to Thee
लसत्-वेष-भूषा-अभिरामंdonning cloathes and ornaments charming
स्मृत्वा स्मृत्वाremembering again and again
तव विलसितानि-Thy various deeds
उच्चकै:-तानि तानिthoroughly all of them
रुद्ध-आलापा:choaking for words
पुन:-गद्गदांagain with faltering
वाचम्-ऊचु:words spoke
सौजन्य-आदीन्behaviour etc.,
निज-पर-भिदाम्-self and others' difference
अपि-अलंalso completely
The Gopikas saw Uddhava donning charming clothes and ornaments similar to Thine. They remembered Thee again and again and Thy various deeds and sports very thoroughly. They were full of emotions and were choking for words, and somehow managed to speak to Uddhava with faltering words. They had forgotten to obseve the norms of behaviour and courtesies, and the differences between themselves and others.
श्रीमान् किं त्वं पितृजनकृते प्रेषितो निर्दयेन
क्वासौ कान्तो नगरसुदृशां हा हरे नाथ पाया: ।
आश्लेषाणाममृतवपुषो हन्त ते चुम्बनाना-
मुन्मादानां कुहकवचसां विस्मरेत् कान्त का वा ॥५॥
श्रीमान् किं त्वंO Sir! Is it (that) you
पितृजन-कृतेfor the sake of the parents
प्रेषित: निर्दयेनare sent by the heart-less one
क्व-असौ कान्त:where is that (Krishna) beloved
नगर-सुदृशांof the city beauties
हा हरे नाथ पाया:O Hari! O Lord! protect us
आश्लेषाणाम्-of the embraces
अमृत-वपुष:of that nectarine form
हन्त तेalas! Of Thee
चुम्बनानाम्the kisses
उन्मादानांthe intense love
कुहक-वचसांand sly words
विस्मरेत् कान्तwill forget O beloved
का वाwhich one (woman)
O Sir! Is it that you are sent by the heartless Krishna for the sake of his parents? Where is the beloved one of the beauties of the city? O Lord! O Hari! Protect us. Alas which one of us women can forget the embrace of the nectarine form, the kisses of intense love and the frolicsome words of the beloved one?'
रासक्रीडालुलितललितं विश्लथत्केशपाशं
मन्दोद्भिन्नश्रमजलकणं लोभनीयं त्वदङ्गम् ।
कारुण्याब्धे सकृदपि समालिङ्गितुं दर्शयेति
प्रेमोन्मादाद्भुवनमदन त्वत्प्रियास्त्वां विलेपु: ॥६॥
रास-क्रीडाduring the Raasa dance
लुलित-ललितंwhich was done up, the beautiful
विश्लथत्-केश-पाशंdishevelled untied (loosened) hair
मन्द-उद्भिन्न-the slight appearance (of)
श्रमजल-कणंof the sweat drops due to exertion
लोभनीयं त्वत्-अङ्गम्enchanting Thy form
कारुण्य-अब्धेO Ocean of Compassion!
सकृत्-अपिat least once
समालिङ्गितुम् दर्शय-to embrace (kindly) show
इति प्रेम-उन्मादात्-thus out of intense love
भुवनमदनO Enchanter of all the worlds!
त्वत्-प्रिया:-Thy dear ones
त्वां विलेपु:implored Thee
During the Raasa dance the done up beautiful hair which were dishevelled and had loosened, and with the appearance of sweat drops, Thy form was rendered enchanting. O Ocean of Compassion! Reveal to us once that form, so that we may once more embrace that form of Thee! O Enchanter of all the worlds!', thus Thy dear ones implored Thee out of intense love.
एवंप्रायैर्विवशवचनैराकुला गोपिकास्ता-
स्त्वत्सन्देशै: प्रकृतिमनयत् सोऽथ विज्ञानगर्भै: ।
स्तत्तद्वार्तासरसमनयत् कानिचिद्वासराणि ॥७॥
एवं-प्रायै:-of such kind
विवश-वचनै:-of despairful words
आकुला: गोपिका:-ता:-overwhelmed with grief, those Gopikaas
त्वत्-सन्देशै:with Thy messages (of deep knowledge)
प्रकृतिम्-अनयत्came to their own selves (became normal)
स:-अथhe (Uddhava) then
विज्ञान-गर्भै:with knowledge of self full of
ताभि:-मुदितमतिभि:-with them who were delighted
त्वत्-मयीभि:-वधूभि:-and who were absorbed in Thee, with (those) women
तत्-तत्-वार्ता-all those tales
सरसम्-अनयत्happily narrating spent
कानिचित्-वासराणिsome days
The Gopikas bemoaned their fate with such words of despair and were overwhelmed with grief. Uddhava comforted them with Thy message of deep spiritual import. They came to their normal selves and thereafter experienced Thy inner presence. Uddhava spent some days with the totally devoted Gopikas joyfully and happily narrating various incidents about Thee.
त्वत्प्रोद्गानै: सहितमनिशं सर्वतो गेहकृत्यं
त्वद्वार्तैव प्रसरति मिथ: सैव चोत्स्वापलापा: ।
चेष्टा: प्रायस्त्वदनुकृतयस्त्वन्मयं सर्वमेवं
दृष्ट्वा तत्र व्यमुहदधिकं विस्मयादुद्धवोऽयम् ॥८॥
त्वत्-प्रोद्गानै: सहितम्-with songs about Thee
अनिशं सर्वत:always everywhere
गेह-कृत्यंhousehold chores
त्वत्-वार्ता-एवThy tale alone
प्रसरतिgoes on
मिथ: सा-एवamongst them that alone
च-उत्स्व-अपलापा:in dreams speaking
चेष्टा: प्राय:-actions mostly
त्वत्-अनुकृतय:-were Thy imitations
त्वत्-मयंThyself personified
सर्वम्-एवंeverything altogether
दृष्ट्वा तत्रseeing there
व्यमुहत्-अधिकंwas stunned very greatly
विस्मयात्-उद्धव:-अयम्with wonder.that Uddhava
The Gopikas always sang songs about Thee. Everywhere while doing their household chores, they narrated Thine tales, amongst themselves. They even spoke about Thee in their dreams.Their actions were mostly imitations of Thy actions as they tried to personify Thee. Everything that there, was permeated by Thy presence. Observing all this that great devotee Uddhava was wonderstruck and left stunned.
राधाया मे प्रियतममिदं मत्प्रियैवं ब्रवीति
त्वं किं मौनं कलयसि सखे मानिनीमत्प्रियेव।
इत्याद्येव प्रवदति सखि त्वत्प्रियो निर्जने मा-
मित्थंवादैररमदयं त्वत्प्रियामुत्पलाक्षीम् ॥९॥
राधाया: मेfor Raadhaa of Mine
प्रियतमम्-इदंthis is the favourite
मत्-प्रिया-एवं ब्रवीतिmy dear one speaks like this
त्वं किं मौनं कलयसिyou are why silence maintaining
सखेOh! Friend
मानिनी-मत्-प्रिया-इवlike my dear and proud one (Raadhaa)
इति-आदि-एवin this way only
प्रवदति सखिsays O friend (Raadhaa)
त्वत्-प्रिय:your beloved (Krishna)
निर्जने माम्-when alone, to me
इत्थं-वादै:-with such words
अरमत्-अयंgladdened he (Uddhava)
त्वत्-प्रियाम्-Thy dear one (Raadhaa)
उत्पल-आक्षीम्the lotus eyed
This is my Raadhaa's favourite. My dear one speaks like this. My dear friend! Why are you silent like my dear proud one (Raadhaa)?' 'In this way O dear friend (Raadhaa) your beloved (Krishna) speaks to me when we are alone.' With these words Uddhava gladdened Thy dear lotus eyed Raadhaa.
एष्यामि द्रागनुपगमनं केवलं कार्यभारा-
द्विश्लेषेऽपि स्मरणदृढतासम्भवान्मास्तु खेद: ।
ब्रह्मानन्दे मिलति नचिरात् सङ्गमो वा वियोग-
स्तुल्यो व: स्यादिति तव गिरा सोऽकरोन्निर्व्यथास्ता: ॥१०॥
एष्यामि द्राक्-I will come soon
अनुपगमनं(my) not coming is
केवलं कार्यभारात्-only due to work pressure
विश्लेषे-अपिin seperation also
स्मरण-दृढता-सम्भवात्-because of firm rememberance
मा-अस्तु खेद:let there be no grief
ब्रह्मानन्दे मिलतिwhen Brahmaananda is attained
न-चिरात्without long (soon)
सङ्गम: वा वियोग:-meeting or seperation
तुल्य: व: स्यात्-same for you will be
इति तव गिराthus by Thy words
स:-अकरोत्-he made
निर्व्यथा:-ता:them free of sorrow
I shall come soon. My not coming is only due to work pressure. When there is firm rememberance, in seperation also there is no grief. Before long when Brahmaananda is attained, you will experience the seperation and union equally blissful.' By such words of Thine Uddhava appeased them.
एवं भक्ति सकलभुवने नेक्षिता न श्रुता वा
किं शास्त्रौघै: किमिह तपसा गोपिकाभ्यो नमोऽस्तु ।
इत्यानन्दाकुलमुपगतं गोकुलादुद्धवं तं
दृष्ट्वा हृष्टो गुरुपुरपते पाहि मामामयौघात् ॥११॥
एवं भक्ति:such devotion
सकल-भुवनेin the whole world
न-ईक्षिताis not seen
न श्रुता वाor is not heard of
किं शास्त्र-औघै:of what use are so many scriptures
किम्-इह तपसाof what use here is penance
गोपिकाभ्य: नम:-अस्तुfor the Gopikaasa may there be salutations
इति-आदि-thus and so
आनन्द-आकुलम्-overwhelmed with joy
उपगतं गोकुलात्-who had returned from Gokula
उद्धवं तंthat Uddhava
दृष्ट्वा हृष्ट:seeing, very happy (Thou)
गुरुपुरपते पाहिO Lord of Guruvaayur! Save me
माम्-आमय-औघात्from my so many afflictions
Such devotion is neither seen nor heard of in the whole world. Of what use is the study of so many scriptures and the practices there in. And what is the use here of all penances. May there be salutations to the Gopikaas.' Thus Uddhava joyfully exclaimed when he returned from Gokula and met Thee. O Lord of Guruvaayur! Who were happy to see Uddhava, save me from so many of my afflictions.

Narayaneeyam - Part XXXXXXXV

Dashaka 75
प्रात: सन्त्रस्तभोजक्षितिपतिवचसा प्रस्तुते मल्लतूर्ये
सङ्घे राज्ञां च मञ्चानभिययुषि गते नन्दगोपेऽपि हर्म्यम् ।
कंसे सौधाधिरूढे त्वमपि सहबल: सानुगश्चारुवेषो
रङ्गद्वारं गतोऽभू: कुपितकुवलयापीडनागावलीढम् ॥१॥
प्रात:early next morning
सन्त्रस्त-भोज-at the frightened Kansa
क्षितिपति-वचसाking's command
प्रस्तुते मल्ल-तूर्येwas commenced the wrestling by the beating of the drums
सङ्घे राज्ञां चand the assembly of kings
मञ्चान्-अभिययुषिto their seats had ascended
गते नन्दगोपे-Nandagopa had gone
अपि हर्म्यम्also to the palace
कंसे-सौध-अधिरूढेand Kansa had climbed to the top balcony of his palace
त्वम्-अपि सह-बल:Thou also along with Balaraam
सानुग:-चारु-वेष:and with friends, attractively dressed
रङ्ग-द्वारं गत:-अभू:to the gate of the arena went (which was)
कुपित-कुवलयापीड-by the angered Kuvalayaapeeda
नाग-अवलीढम्the elephant obstructed
Early the next morning, the frightened king Kansa commanded the commencement of the wrestling by the beating of the drums. The assembly of the kings ascended their respective seats to witness the wrestling. Nandagopa had also gone to the palace, and Kansa had also climbed to the top balcony of his palace. Thou along with Balaraama and Thy friends, dressed attractively approached the gates of the arena which was obstructed by the angered great elephant Kuvalayaapeeda.
पापिष्ठापेहि मार्गाद्द्रुतमिति वचसा निष्ठुरक्रुद्धबुद्धे-
रम्बष्ठस्य प्रणोदादधिकजवजुषा हस्तिना गृह्यमाण: ।
केलीमुक्तोऽथ गोपीकुचकलशचिरस्पर्धिनं कुम्भमस्य
व्याहत्यालीयथास्त्वं चरणभुवि पुनर्निर्गतो वल्गुहासी ॥२॥
पापिष्ठ-अपेहिO wicked one, move away
मार्गात्-द्रुतम्-from the way quickly
इति वचसाthus saying
निष्ठुर-क्रुद्ध-बुद्धे-the cruel and angry minded
अम्बष्ठस्य प्रणोदात्-mahout's prompting
अधिक-जव-जुषाmore speed taking
हस्तिना गृह्यमाण:by the elephant (Thou) being caught
केली-मुक्त:-अथplayfully releasing Thyself, then
गोपी-कुच-कलश-the Gopikas' pot like breasts
चिर-स्पर्धिनंwho was always competing
कुम्भम्-अस्य व्याहत्य-on this (elephant's) forehead striking a blow
अलीयथा:-त्वंhid Thou
चरण-भुविbetween its (elephant's) legs
पुन:-निर्गत:(Thou) again came out
वल्गु-हासीsweetly smiling
Thou said 'O wicked one move away from the way quickly'. At this the cruel and angry minded mahout prompted the elephant, who taking great speed caught Thee in its tusks. As though in play Thou released Thyself and struck a blow on the elephant's bulging forehead which rivalled with the Gopikas' pot like breasts. Thou then hid between the elephant's legs for sometime and then came out smiling sweetly.
हस्तप्राप्योऽप्यगम्यो झटिति मुनिजनस्येव धावन् गजेन्द्रं
क्रीडन्नापात्य भूमौ पुनरपिपततस्तस्य दन्तं सजीवम् ।
मूलादुन्मूल्य तन्मूलगमहितमहामौक्तिकान्यात्ममित्रे
प्रादास्त्वं हारमेभिर्ललितविरचितं राधिकायै दिशेति ॥३॥
हस्त-प्राप्य:-अपि-in the hands grasped also
अगम्य: झटितिunattainable hastily
मुनिजनस्य-of the sages
इव धावन्in the same manner, the running
गजेन्द्रं क्रीडन्-elephant playfully
आपात्य भूमौthrowing down on the ground
पुन:-अभिपतत:-तस्यagain when charging he was
दन्तं सजीवम्the tooth, live
मूलात्-उन्मूल्यfrom its roots pulling out
तत्-मूलग-off its (the tusks') root
महित-महा-priceless large
आत्म-मित्रेto Thy friend
प्रादा:-त्वम्Thou gave (saying)
हारम्-एभि:-necklace with these
ललित-विरचितंbeautifully made
राधिकायैto Raadhaa
दिश-इतिgive, thus
To the sages who meditate, just as Thou seem to be in their grasp but suddenly elude them, so also Thou escaped even when Thou were in the grasp of the elephant, running away just when it seemed to catch hold of Thee. Thou then playfully threw him on the ground. As he again rushed towards Thee, Thou pulled out its tooth from the root of its tusk. From there emerged priceless large pearls which Thou gave to Thy friend asking him to get them made into a beautiful necklace and give it to Raadhaa.
गृह्णानं दन्तमंसे युतमथ हलिना रङ्गमङ्गाविशन्तं
त्वां मङ्गल्याङ्गभङ्गीरभसहृतमनोलोचना वीक्ष्य लोका: ।
हंहो धन्यो हि नन्दो नहि नहि पशुपालाङ्गना नो यशोदा
नो नो धन्येक्षणा: स्मस्त्रिजगति वयमेवेति सर्वे शशंसु: ॥४॥
गृह्णानं दन्तम्-अंसेcarrying the tusk on the shoulder
युतम्-अथ हलिनाwith Balaraam then
रङ्गम्-अङ्ग-the arena, O Lord!
त्वां मङ्गल्य-अङ्ग-भङ्गी-Thee with auspicious beautiful form
रभस-हृत-मन:-लोचनाforcefully drawing the mind and eyes
वीक्ष्य लोका:seeing, the people (exclaimed)
हंहो धन्य हि नन्द:Oh! Fortunate indeed is Nanda
नहि नहि पशुपाल-अङ्गनाno no the Gopa women
नो यशोदाno Yashodaa
नो नो धन्य-ईक्षणा: स्म:-no no fortunate are we the onlookers
त्रिजगतिin the three worlds
वयम्-एव-इतिwe alone (are fortunate) thus
सर्वे शशंसु:everyone declared
O Lord! Carrying the tusk on the shoulder, as Thou entered the arena with Balaraama, everyone's eyes and minds were forcefully drawn towards Thy auspicious form.The people exclaimed 'O fortunate indeed is Nanda, no no the Gopikaas, no Yashodaa, no no we the onlookers are fortunate, we alone are fortunate indeed in the three worlds.' Thus everyone declared.
पूर्णं ब्रह्मैव साक्षान्निरवधि परमानन्दसान्द्रप्रकाशं
गोपेशु त्वं व्यलासीर्न खलु बहुजनैस्तावदावेदितोऽभू: ।
दृष्ट्वऽथ त्वां तदेदंप्रथममुपगते पुण्यकाले जनौघा:
पूर्णानन्दा विपापा: सरसमभिजगुस्त्वत्कृतानि स्मृतानि ॥५॥
पूर्णं ब्रह्म-एवThe Complete Brahman Itself That Thou are
साक्षात्-निरवधिright in front, free from all limitations
परम-आनन्द-सान्द्र-प्रकाशंof the nature of supreme bliss and pure consciousness
गोपेषु त्वं व्यलासी:-among the Gopas Thou shone
न खलु बहु-जनै:-not indeed by many people
तावत्-आविदेत:-अभू:then (Thou) were known (as Brahamn)
दृष्ट्वा-अथ त्वांthen seeing Thee
तत्-इदम्-प्रथमम्-that this for the first time
उपगते पुण्यकालेarising of the auspicious time
जन-औघा:hordes of people
पूर्णानन्दा विपापा:full of bliss, becoming free from sin
सरसम्-अभिजगु:-joyfully narrated
त्वत्-कृतानि स्मृतानिThy deeds, which they remembered
Not many people had the knowledge that Thou who shone and lived among the Gopas were Brahman incarnate and the essence of Supreme Bliss and Pure consciousness, free from all limitations. For many of them the auspicious time had arisen that they saw Thee for the first time and were full of bliss and became free from sin and joyfully narrated Thy deeds which they remembered.
चाणूरो मल्लवीरस्तदनु नृपगिरा मुष्टिको मुष्टिशाली
त्वां रामं चाभिपेदे झटझटिति मिथो मुष्टिपातातिरूक्षम् ।
उत्पातापातनाकर्षणविविधरणान्यासतां तत्र चित्रं
मृत्यो: प्रागेव मल्लप्रभुरगमदयं भूरिशो बन्धमोक्षान् ॥६॥
चाणूर: मल्लवीर:-Chaanoora, the champion wrestler
तदनु नृप-गिराthereafter, at the king's command
मुष्टिक: मुष्टिशालीMushtika, the boxer
त्वां रामं च-अभिपेदेThee and Balaraama attacked
झटझटिति मिथ:loudly and mutually
मुष्टि-पात-अति-रूक्षम्with fists and blows fierce
उत्पात-आपातन-आकर्षण-throwing up, pushing down and dragging
विविध-रणानि-(such) various methods of fight
आसतां तत्र चित्रंwhich were there, what a wonder
मृत्यो: प्राक्-एवeven before death
मल्लप्रभु:-अगमत्-अयंthis champion of wrestling attained
भूरिश: बन्ध-मोक्षान्many times bondage and release
At the king's command the champion wrestler Chaanoor and the boxer Mushtika attacked Thee and Balaraama. There were mutual and loud and fierce blows of fists, throwing up, pushing down and dragging and various such methods of fight were used. What a wonder it is that the leading wrestler Chaanoor, even before his death attained bondage and release many times at Thy hands.
हा धिक् कष्टं कुमारौ सुललितवपुषौ मल्लवीरौ कठोरौ
न द्रक्ष्यामो व्रजामस्त्वरितमिति जने भाषमाणे तदानीम् ।
चाणूरं तं करोद्भ्रामणविगलदसुं पोथयामासिथोर्व्यां
पिष्टोऽभून्मुष्टिकोऽपि द्रुतमथ हलिना नष्टशिष्टैर्दधावे ॥७॥
हा धिक् कष्टंalas! How bad!
कुमारौ सुललित-वपुषौthe two boys, tender bodied
मल्लवीरौ कठोरौthe (two) wrestlers are tough
न द्रक्ष्याम:(we will) not see (this fight)
व्रजाम:-त्वरितम्-will go away quickly
इति जने भाषमाणेthus when people were talking
तदानीम् चाणूरं तंthen that Chaanoor
कर-उद्भ्रामण-(who was) by hand whirled around (by Thee)
विगलत्-असुं(and so) whose life slipped away (he died)
पोथयामासिथ-उर्व्यां(Thou) threw him on the earth
पिष्ट:-अभूत्-मुष्टिक:-अपिcrushed was Mushtika also
द्रुतम्-अथ हलिनाquickly then by Balaraama
नष्ट-शिष्टै:-दधावेother than the (two) killed ran away
Alas! How bad! The two boys are tender bodied and the two wrestelers are tough. We will go away quickly and not see this unequal contest,' thus the people were talking among themselves. Just then Thou caught hold of Chaanoor's arm and whirled him round and round and threw him dead on the ground. Mushtika was also quickly crushed to death by Balaraama. The remaining wrestlers ran away out of fear.
कंस संवार्य तूर्यं खलमतिरविदन् कार्यमार्यान् पितृंस्ता-
नाहन्तुं व्याप्तमूर्तेस्तव च समशिषद्दूरमुत्सारणाय ।
रुष्टो दुष्टोक्तिभिस्त्वं गरुड इव गिरिं मञ्चमञ्चन्नुदञ्चत्-
खड्गव्यावल्गदुस्संग्रहमपि च हठात् प्राग्रहीरौग्रसेनिम् ॥८॥
कंस संवार्य तूर्यंKansa, stopping the drums
खल-मति:-अविदन्(he) the wicked not knowing
कार्यम्-what to do
आर्यान्-पितॄन्-तान्-आहन्तुंthose respected parents to be killed
व्याप्तमूर्ते:-तवO Omniscient Lord! Thine (the parents)
च समशिषत्-and ordered
दूरम्-उत्सारणायto drive far away
रुष्ट: दुष्ट-उक्तिभि: -त्वंannoyed by wicked words Thou
गरुड:-इव गिरिंlike Garuda flying to (the top of a ) mountain
मञ्चम्-अञ्चन्-jumping to the throne (of Kansa)
उदञ्चत्-खड्ग-व्यावल्ग-raised up sword brandishing
दुस्संग्रहम्-अपि(so) difficult to catch hold of (such Kansa)
च हठात् प्राग्रही:-with determination (Thou) caught hold of
औग्रसेनिम्that son of Ugrasena
Kansa asked for the drums to be stopped. Then the wicked one not knowing what to do ordered for Thy respected parents to be killed. O Omnipresent Lord! He also ordered that Thou be driven away to a remote place. Thou were very annoyed at his wicked words. Thou leaped with determination to the throne of Kansa to the highest balcony of his palace, like a Garuda ascends to the top of the mountain, and gripped him, the son of Ugrasena, though he was difficult to catch hold of because he resisted with brandishing a sword.
सद्यो निष्पिष्टसन्धिं भुवि नरपतिमापात्य तस्योपरिस्टा-
त्त्वय्यापात्ये तदैव त्वदुपरि पतिता नाकिनां पुष्पवृष्टि: ।
किं किं ब्रूमस्तदानीं सततमपि भिया त्वद्गतात्मा स भेजे
सायुज्यं त्वद्वधोत्था परम परमियं वासना कालनेमे: ॥९॥
सद्य: निष्पिष्ट-सन्धिंimmediately crushing his joints
भुवि नरपतिम्-आपात्यon the ground the king hurling
तस्य-उपरिष्टात्-on top of him
त्वयि-आपात्ये तदा-एवThou falling at that very moment
त्वत्-उपरि पतिताon Thee fell
नाकिनां पुष्प वृष्टि:from the gods, shower of flowers
किं किं ब्रूम:-तदानींwhat all should I say, at that time
सततम्-अपि भियाalways out of fear
त्वत्-गत-आत्मा स भेजेthinking of you he attained
सायुज्यं त्वत्-वध-उत्थाunion with Thee, arising from Thee killing him
परम परम-इयंO Supreme Being! This alone
वासना कालनेमे:was the vaasanaa (past life's tendency), of Kaalanemi
Immediately crushing his joints Thou hurled the king on the ground and jumped on his body. At that very moment the gods in heaven showered flowers on Thee. What shall I say! O Supreme Being! Though Kansa always remembered Thee out of fear, he attained union with Thee as a result of Thou killing him. This was due to his vaasanaa (past life's tendency) as Kaalanemi (in his previous birth) who was killed by Thee.
तद्भ्रातृनष्ट पिष्ट्वा द्रुतमथ पितरौ सन्नमन्नुग्रसेनं
कृत्वा राजानमुच्चैर्यदुकुलमखिलं मोदयन् कामदानै: ।
भक्तानामुत्तमं चोद्धवममरगुरोराप्तनीतिं सखायं
लब्ध्वा तुष्टो नगर्यां पवनपुरपते रुन्धि मे सर्वरोगान् ॥१०॥
तत्-भ्रातृन्-अष्ट पिष्ट्वाhis eight brothers killing
द्रुतम्-अथquickly then
पितरौ सन्नमन्-prostrating before the parents
उग्रसेनं कृत्वा राजानम्-Ugrasena making the king
उच्चै:-यदुकुलम्-अखिलंgreatly the whole of the Yaadava clan
मोदयन् कामदानै:making happy by giving what they desired
भक्तानाम्-उत्तमंand the greatest of devotees
अमरगुरो:-आप्त-नीतिंwho had received the ethics from the preceptors of gods (Brahaspati)
सखायं लब्ध्वाgetting as friend
तुष्ट: नगर्यांsatisfied (resided) in the capital city
पवनपुरपतेO Lord of Guruvaayur!
रुन्धि मे सर्व-रोगान्remove my all afflictions
Quickly then Thou killed Kansa's eight brothers. Prostrating before Thy parents, Thou made Ugrasena the king and made the whole Yaadava clan greatly happy by giving them what they desired. Thou then got Uddhava as friend who was the greatest of devotees and had recieved instructions into the laws of ethics from the preceptor of gods, Brihaspati. Thou resided in the capital with satisfaction. O Lord of Guruvaayur! deign to remove all my afflictions.